Where are Lynndie England and Charles Graner now?

After serving a little more than a year in prison, Lynndie England returned home to Fort Ashby, West Virginia. She is currently unemployed and on anti-depressants. In 2009, Lynndie released the book Tortured: Lynndie England, Abu Ghraib and the Photographs that Shocked the World.

Charles Graner was released from prison on August 6, 2011, after serving more than 6 years in prison for his role in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. After his conviction, Graner married Megan Ambuhl, another member of his unit involved in the scandal. Graner's exact whereabouts are unknown.

The Senate Armed Services Committee Report on Treating of Detainees in December 2008

The Senate Armed Services Committee Report, issued jointly by Carl Levin and John McCain, concluded that the United States' own Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape protocols had been used as a model for the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. SERE techniques had been developed to aid US personnel in case of capture during the Cold War, these training techniques had never been intended to be used against detainees. Senior Defense Department officials had inquired about the SERE program as early as December of 200. The Committee concluded that actions and statements taken by senior Bush Administration officials had lead to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, creating an atmosphere where such abuses as those that occurred there to be acceptable procedure.

Antonio Taguba and his report, May 2004

General Antonio Taguba's report on the Abu Ghraib torture scandal included confirming the existence of Graner's photos, four confessions by MPs working at the unit and at least one video of abuse. The images contained within these documents included simulated fellatio, human pyramids, male detainees wearing panties and choke collars and female detainees being forced to expose themselves to the guards. According to Taguba there was at least one video of a female detainee being sodomized by an American soldier. On at least two different occasions, Colonel Thomas Pappas fromthe 205th Military Intelligence Brigade allowed unmuzzled dogs in the interrogation rooms.

Taguba's report would conclude that the General Karpinski had lied about the number of prison inspections she had performed, combined with the Mps status as subordinate to Military Intelligence, rather than their own officers, resulted in a lack of leadership at the facility. Furthermore, MPs at Abu Ghraib had not received the requisite training necessary in order to function as security personnel at a prison. The Mps were not given formal shift briefings relating to proper conduct or standard operating procedures, leaving them completely at the mercy of Military Intelligence and civilian CIA contractors. These factors combined created an environment by which the Abu Ghraib MPs were essentially vulnerable to exploitation and forced to cooperate with interrogation procedures they would not normally be a part of.

How did the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal become known and what was the immediate result?

Charles Graner loaned two CDs of pictures he had taken while in Iraq to another MP, Joseph Darby. One of the CDs contained content almost exclusively relating to the abuse that had been taking place at Abu Ghraib. Darby would turn a copy of the pictures over to the Army's Criminal Investigation Command (CID). CID immediately launched an investigation of the MPs working at Abu Ghraib's Hard Site. Amnesty boxes were placed around the prison for the MPs to surrender potentially incriminating materials.

Nevertheless, the story would be broken by 60 Minutes in the spring of 2004. Joseph Darby, who had originally been promised anonymity, would receive the dubious honor of the personal thanks of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on national television. Darby was on duty in Iraq at the time of Rumsfeld's statement and would have to be flown home in short order. The investigation that followed the discovery of Graner's photographs would conclude that the activities of Abu Ghraib's night shift had no official sanction and had not been ordered by anyone in authority to make such decisions.

The Schlesinger Report and the upper administration of the White House attempted to isolate the activities at Abu Ghraib from previous Bush administration and even previous military and White House procedures that had been in place since the Vietnam War. In much the same way as those men standing trial at Nuremburg in 1945, the shock on the faces of American officials at every level seemed to have been one of general shock and disgust. The compartmentalized nature of each individual task of the War on Terror, the Iraq War, Abu Ghraib, and general US government policy allowed the vast majority of individuals involved in the incident to absolve themselves of direct guilt. They weren't killing jews, they just conducted the train that took them to Dachau; they weren't authorizing the torture of Iraqi prisoners, they simply provided a list of acceptable "enhanced interrogation techniques."

How did the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal become known and what was the immediate result?

Charles Graner would become de facto head of operations to "soften up" the prisoners at Abu Ghraib for interrogation, a sort of torturer in chief. The compartmentalized nature of the interrogations and torture and gradual desensitization were the primary reasons that the other soldiers at Abu Ghraib turned a blind eye to the proceedings. The majority of the abuse at Abu Ghraib could be blamed on only a few soldiers and at the orders of another small group of Military Intelligence or OGA operatives; there was always someone else to blame and the the abuse of prisoners became trivial. Furthermore, the MPs at Abu Ghraib were able to labor under the false premise that the inmates handled in this fashion were terrorists and American-killing insurgents.

On November 24, 2003 a riot broke out at Abu Ghraib. Three detainees were killed, another nine were injured and nine MPs were also injured. Once the riot had been contained, the MPs began "softening up" the prisoners for a presumable interrogation, regarding the riot. The detainees (prisoners) were forced into human pyramids and poses of simulated fellatio; pictures were taken, pictures that would cause shock, horror and embarrassment to the United States at large.It was at the end of the year in 2003 when Corporal Charles Graner was promoted to Sergeant, as if condoning some of the worst abuses that occurred at the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib.

As unethical as the treatment of the Hard Site's detainees was by the MPs, much worse occurred in the interrogation rooms. Beatings occurred in the interrogation rooms with some frequency, with some of the interrogation sessions resulting in death for the detainees. At least one death, that of Manadel al-Jamadi, was ruled a homicide These beaten prisoners were often denied access to medical personnel. It is unclear at this time how many prisoners died as a result of the interrogations

Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions are a series of four treaties and additional protocols, ratified in 1949 by 194 nations. The treaties extensively detail how prisoners, both military and civilian, should be treated during wartime. Generally speaking, in order to be in compliance with the Geneva Conventions a nation's prisoners must be free from physical and sexual abuse, their customs and religion must be respected, and the prisoners must be able to maintain reasonable level of human dignity while incarcerated. Prior to the War on Terror, the United States had traditionally held itself to a standard of human rights much higher that those set by the Geneva conventions. The United States had also advocated that other nations adopt a more humane level of treatment than those set by the conventions.

Following the September 11, 2001 bombings, the United States Department of Justice would formulate the an opinion stating that members of al-Qaeda and by extension insurgents in general were not covered by the Geneva conventions. John Yoo, an official in the justice department, would become an outspoken proponent of this theory and would eventually provide the legal justification for enhanced interrogation techniques. Yoo would work closely with the Office of the Vice President. In a memo to the White House in 2002, Yoo would assert that the Geneva convention did not cover the inflicting of physical pain, so long as physical pain did not result in serious injury, this memo would form the basis for enhanced interrogation techniques used in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantanamo Bay. Yoo would also argue that the President of the United States was not bound by the War Crimes Act. Central to this theory was the idea that the Geneva Conventions should not cover unsanctioned insurgent groups, only soldiers of an opposing nation. In 2002, President George W. Bush would determine that insurgents would be treated as unlawful enemy combatants, hence that they were not entitled to the rights of the Geneva convention.

Military Police Moved from Incarceration Staff and Placed Under Military Intelligence

The transfer of the Military Police from General Karpinski's command was done in August-September of 2003 at the behest of General Miller. The MPs were given the task of preparing prisoners for interrogation. In other words, the MPs were instructed to use enhanced interrogation techniques: stress positions, humiliation, and sleep deprivation. The Military Police were being given these orders by civilian contractors, often referred to as Other Government Agency (OGA) and Military Intelligence. Once specific MP, the now infamous Sergeant Charles Graner, was actively sought to participate in this routine, courtesy of his previous prison experience.

Major General Geoffrey Miller, Donald Rumsfeld, Ricardo Sanchez and Interrogation Techniques

Frustrated with the lack of intelligence flowing from Iraq and Abu Ghraib, Donald Rumsfeld dispatched Major General Geoffrey Miller to Iraq in August of 2003 to take the intelligence situation in hand and get results. Miller had instituted a program at Guantanamo Bay that included restraining prisoners in one position for 16 hours more, long enough that most would evacuate on themselves. Other methods included solitary confinement, stress positions, sensory disorientation, phobias (particularly dogs), and physical humiliation. All of these practices enjoyed the approval of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Miller would also have the written authority of General Ricardo Sanchez, then Commander of US forces in Iraq. The memo sent out by General Sanchez approved a list interrogation techniques that were in violation of the Geneva Conventions; the official position of the administration was that the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply in Iraq.

The "Hard Site" and the Failure of "Intelligence" at Abu Ghraib

The so-called "Hard Site" at Abu Ghraib purportedly housed the prisoners military intelligence officers believed possessed valuable intelligence. In addition to these prisoners, the families of these high value captures were also housed at the hard site, presumably for leverage over the prisoners. Only 6-7 soldiers from the 372nd MP Company would guard over one thousand detainees and their families at any given time.

During the course of the summer of 2003, the growing insurgency within Iraq would make the American intelligence community desperate. A campaign of bombing attacks, including the Syrian and Turkish embassies and culminating in the October 26, 2003 Rashid Hotel bombing raised questions about the insurgency with few readily available answers. The United States Armed Forces had no idea who they were fighting or why. To resolve this situation, the determination was made to interrogate as many Iraqis as possible. The desperate need for intelligence no matter the cost brought a flood of prisoners into Abu Ghraib's Hard Site.

Military intelligence officers responsible for interrogations at Abu Ghraib were completely unprepared for the sheer number of people they were expected to interrogate; by the interrogator's own estimates, less than 25% of the prisoners housed at the hard site were in fact members of groups the United States military was targeting or had any pertinent intelligence.

Abu Ghraib - The Location, Atmosphere, and Situation at Abu Ghraib by September 2003

When the 372nd MP Company arrived at Abu Ghraib, the location was almost more akin to death camp than a prison. Wild dogs uncovered and devoured corpses buried on the site. Two ovens were located near the death chamber to incinerate the dead. During Saddam's regime, it is estimated that as many as 80 people a day were executed by hanging at Abu Ghraib. Prisons have their own unique smell, a curious amalgamation of coffee, rancid food, burned paper, and of course, human excrement. The smell at Abu Ghraib, which was located in an area known for 120 degree heat, would have been overpowering.

The 372nd MP Company was originally trained to support combat operations, not function as correctional officers. Compounding the 372nd's lack of experience in these operations was the all too natural plunge in morale the unit experienced upon discovering what their new role in Iraq would be. As if that were not enough, Abu Ghraib would see more combat that any static position in the country; the prison would come under fire every day for weeks at a time. Between July and the end of September, the prison's population would grow from just under 1000 to over 6000. To guard this cramped, exposed population seething with anger, the 372nd had just 300 MPs. Overcrowding, low morale, lack of manpower, and poor facilities would assure that a crisis would develop.

American Techniques of War and Iraqi Civilians

Lacking intelligence regarding the budding Iraqi insurgency, the United States and its allies began rounding up suspects for interrogation in the summer of 2003. Those men rounded up often were taken from their homes with minimal provocation, sometimes as little as simply possessing a cd with Saddam Hussein's face on it. Families were torn apart based on flimsy evidence. This is widely considered to be the crudest form of intelligence gathering a nation can engage, demeaning and cruel to boot. Many American soldiers and officers would question and balk at the things they were called to do, most however, did not. Some American military personnel, such as Charles Graner and Lynndie England, would engage in some of the most notorious instances of prisoner abuse in the history of the United States. Tens of thousands Iraqi civilians would pass through the gates of Abu Ghraib, often to later be released with no charges ever brought before them. Even General Odierno's 4th Infantry Division, widely considered one of the more abusive units, would estimate that at least three quarters of suspected insurgents they imprisoned were in fact innocent. This method of suppression and intelligence gathering proved to be counter-productive.

Iraq: Summer and Fall of 2003

The United States had invaded Iraq and destroyed Saddam Hussein's army in short order. The Army had expected the beginnings of a civilian government to crop up shortly after the invasion and be able to draw on the Iraqi army for labor and security duties. When Paul Bremer disbanded the army and suspended elections until a future date, the already chaotic situation in Iraq deteriorated even further. The US Army is a massive strike force and not designed for static occupation or fighting insurgency. With the all too understandable failure of the US Armed Forces to restore order within Iraq, insurgencies sprouted across the country.

During the summer of 2003, the United States Army found itself sorely lacking in intelligence assets and date. US forces within Iraq had been operating under the assumptions that all resistance at this point would be holdouts from Saddam's government and largely unorganized, an assertion that would prove false. Central Command under John Abizaid launched a campaign to acquire as much intelligence as possible about the situation in Iraq and the sentiments of its people and create a centralized database with it. In response the mounting insurgency, ground commanders began conducting sweeps to collect prisoners for interrogation, in hopes of discovering the whereabouts and nature of the enemy they faced. In a move that he believed would assure quick and accurate data, General Sanchez issued a memorandum containing 29 interrogation techniques approved for use on the prisoners being netted in the house-to-house sweeps

Geneva Conventions and the United States

The Geneva Conventions are a series of four treaties and additional protocols, ratified in 1949 by 194 nations. The treaties extensively detail how prisoners, both military and civilian, should be treated during wartime. Generally speaking, in order to be in compliance with the Geneva Conventions a nation's prisoners must be free from physical and sexual abuse, their customs and religion must be respected, and the prisoners must be able to maintain reasonable level of human dignity while incarcerated. Prior to the War on Terror, the United States had traditionally held itself to a standard of human rights much higher that those set by the Geneva conventions. The United States had also advocated that other nations adopt a more humane level of treatment than those set by the conventions.

Following the September 11, 2001 bombings, the United States Department of Justice would formulate the an opinion stating that members of al-Qaeda and by extension insurgents in general were not covered by the Geneva conventions. John Yoo, an official in the justice department, would become an outspoken proponent of this theory and would eventually provide the legal justification for enhanced interrogation techniques. Yoo would work closely with the Office of the Vice President. In a memo to the White House in 2002, Yoo would assert that the Geneva convention did not cover the inflicting of physical pain, so long as physical pain did not result in serious injury, this memo would form the basis for enhanced interrogation techniques used in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantanamo Bay. Yoo would also argue that the President of the United States was not bound by the War Crimes Act. Central to this theory was the idea that the Geneva Conventions should not cover unsanctioned insurgent groups, only soldiers of an opposing nation. In 2002, President George W. Bush would determine that insurgents would be treated as unlawful enemy combatants, hence that they were not entitled to the rights of the Geneva convention.