Iraq: Summer and Fall of 2003

The United States had invaded Iraq and destroyed Saddam Hussein's army in short order. The Army had expected the beginnings of a civilian government to crop up shortly after the invasion and be able to draw on the Iraqi army for labor and security duties. When Paul Bremer disbanded the army and suspended elections until a future date, the already chaotic situation in Iraq deteriorated even further. The US Army is a massive strike force and not designed for static occupation or fighting insurgency. With the all too understandable failure of the US Armed Forces to restore order within Iraq, insurgencies sprouted across the country.

During the summer of 2003, the United States Army found itself sorely lacking in intelligence assets and date. US forces within Iraq had been operating under the assumptions that all resistance at this point would be holdouts from Saddam's government and largely unorganized, an assertion that would prove false. Central Command under John Abizaid launched a campaign to acquire as much intelligence as possible about the situation in Iraq and the sentiments of its people and create a centralized database with it. In response the mounting insurgency, ground commanders began conducting sweeps to collect prisoners for interrogation, in hopes of discovering the whereabouts and nature of the enemy they faced. In a move that he believed would assure quick and accurate data, General Sanchez issued a memorandum containing 29 interrogation techniques approved for use on the prisoners being netted in the house-to-house sweeps